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Abstract
The 2015 UK Supreme Court judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire reinforces 
the importance of informed consent to medical treatment. This paper suggests that 
Montgomery recognises the challenge faced by vulnerable individuals in choosing 
between treatment options and making decisions with appreciation of information 
about material risks. The judgment endorses a form of weak paternalism to safe-
guard such persons, which is not disrespectful of the aggregate principles of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005. But ethical practice requires professionals to tread care-
fully between weak and hard paternalism in the context of therapeutic interactions 
with vulnerable patients, while ensuring their awareness of material risks.
Keywords Informed consent · Decision-making · Vulnerable patients · 
Montgomery · MCA 2005
Introduction
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) and the judgment of the UK Supreme Court 
in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [38]1 rank among the cornerstones of 
English medical law. The MCA applies to persons who lack decision-making capac-
ity. Montgomery relates to persons of ‘sound mind’, and stipulates that such persons 
must be informed about material risks of the proposed treatment and available alter-
native options of intervention [38 at 87]. The judgment includes exceptions for per-
sons unable to consent in a clinical emergency, competent patients ‘waiving’ their 
right to be informed about risks, and the ‘therapeutic exception’ where doctors may 
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intentionally withhold information to protect patients [38 at 85, 88 and 91]. Fail-
ure to take reasonable steps to ensure the patient is aware about material risks is a 
breach of the duty of care, and would count as negligence when there is resultant 
harm. This paper will consider the influence of vulnerabilities on decision-making 
by patients about their treatment; and suggest that in spite of implicitly acknowledg-
ing this issue, Montgomery has also contributed to newer vulnerabilities. It will be 
argued that empowering vulnerable patients necessitates helping them to correctly 
appreciate material risks.2 The paper will explore whether such process breaches the 
MCA.
The paper commences with brief overviews of the concept of vulnerability, the 
core elements of Montgomery and the principles of the MCA. This will be followed 
by an argument in favour of weak paternalism to limit harm arising from decisions 
made by vulnerable patients with inadequate awareness of material risks and alter-
native options of intervention. It will be highlighted that the approach is congruent 
with the stipulations laid down by Montgomery.
Coggon and Miola have stressed the importance of distinguishing between auton-
omy and liberty in relation to deciding about treatment, and argued that the exer-
cise of reason based on ‘good ground of knowledge and understanding’ is crucial to 
autonomy in medical law [12, p529]. This Kantian interpretation of autonomy is rel-
evant to the discussions in this paper. Coggon and Miola have also highlighted how 
English courts have supported the Millian notion of liberty in the desire to promote 
autonomy [12, p533]. This is important because Montgomery has been heralded 
authors like Badenoch as the triumph of patient autonomy that marks the beginning 
of the end for medical paternalism [4, p12]. But Montgomery has also attracted criti-
cism for its consumer-focussed approach to healthcare that requires patients to make 
informed choices, which may be challenging for vulnerable individuals [49].
Buetow and Elwyn have argued that patients are morally responsible for deci-
sions about their own treatment [6]. In a similar vein, Draper and Sorrell suggest 
that being vulnerable does not automatically exclude patients from obligations 
towards themselves [14, p339]. Such perspectives risk overlooking constraints on 
autonomy that are induced and perpetuated by vulnerabilities. Holding vulnerable 
persons responsible for unfavourable outcomes is problematic, and is compounded 
when professionals overlook vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability and Post‑Montgomery Decision‑Making
Concepts of Vulnerability
‘Vulnerability’ is an oft-used but debated term [43, p1058]. Schroeder and Gefe-
nas interpret vulnerability as being ‘defenceless, liable, imperfect, unprepared, frail, 
susceptible, weak, helpless, open to, exposed to danger’ [53, p114] which reso-
nates with the view of Mackenzie and co-authors that fragility and susceptibility 
2 Provided there is no irremediable issue with the patient’s comprehension.
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to suffering are key elements of the concept [32, p4]. Martha Fineman provides an 
ontological interpretation of vulnerability as a ‘universal, inevitable, enduring aspect 
of human condition’ in arguing that vulnerability originates from our existence as 
embodied beings, which results in humans being continuously confronted with risks 
of ‘harm, injury and misfortune’ [19, p8]. The intricate relationship of vulnerability 
to the human body has been noted by other authors. Bryan Turner associates embod-
iment with the propensity to sickness, infirmity, suffering and death [58 p29], and 
Judith Butler argues that vulnerability is inextricably associated with social interac-
tion and interdependency [7, p22].
Fineman also suggests that preoccupation with identity-based issues may cloud 
scrutiny of the limits of social justice and governmental responsibilities [20, p254]. 
Goodin perceives vulnerability to be essentially relational in nature [22, p112], and 
Allen Wood interprets vulnerability as the key to exploitation that facilitates exer-
tion of power by one party over another [59, p142]. Goodin describes vulnerability 
as a state of being under a perpetual threat of harm [22, p110]. Such threats may 
affect physical and psychological domains of a person, and extend to economic, 
institutional and moral harms [43, p1058]. The overall harm may extend beyond the 
pathological process of an illness, and include all harm resulting from her interac-
tions with healthcare systems and professionals.
There is general agreement on two broad sub-categories of vulnerability, though 
some authors believe a third category needs to be considered. The first is inherent 
vulnerability, described by Fineman as vulnerability that results from the embod-
ied existence of human beings, which suggests that some forms of vulnerability are 
not eliminable [19]. The second is situational vulnerability, which is context-specific 
and results from social, political, economic, or environmental factors exerting their 
effects in brief, enduring or intermittent manner on persons. Examples include sud-
den unemployment, withdrawal of benefits or loss of other social support. Patho-
genic vulnerability is said to exist as a ‘subset’ within situational vulnerability but 
caused by primarily ‘interpersonal’ issues. Goodin describes it as ‘morally unaccep-
table vulnerabilities and dependencies which we should, but have not yet managed 
to, eliminate’ [22, p203]. Apart from interpersonal issues like potential or actual 
abuse, this category would include political or social domination and oppression. 
Stigma associated with mental disorders is an appropriate example in this regard. 
Dunn, Clare and Holland suggest that situational vulnerability is more complex than 
its inherent counterpart and the latter may induce the former—thus causing a ‘vul-
nerable adult’ to become ‘doubly vulnerable’ [15, p238].
The legal interpretation of vulnerability lays greater stress on the inherent char-
acteristics of the person at risk of experiencing harm [45, p54].3 But this needs to 
be considered with situational issues. An example of the latter is the disadvanta-
geous position of patients during consultations [44] due to imbalance between ‘the 
knowledge and objectivity of the doctor and the ignorance and subjectivity of the 
patient’, as described by Lord Templeman in Sidaway [54, p904]. Seemingly unwise 
3 In the context of healthcare, such harm may involve physical, mental or social domains, or a combina-
tion of these.
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decisions of the patient coupled with markers of vulnerability could call her deci-
sion-making ability into question. In contrast, apparently ‘wise’ decisions (such as 
when a patient demurely accepts the suggested treatment) may also be associated 
with risks that she might not have appreciated, but which does not get subjected to 
similar scrutiny.
Appreciation of risk-related information is addressed in Montgomery, and will 
be discussed later. But at this juncture it is necessary to summarise the main stipula-
tions laid down by the judgement, which need to be read alongside the key elements 
of the MCA.
Montgomery and the MCA: Key Elements
Montgomery centred upon non-provision of risk-related information by an obste-
trician to Mrs Nadine Montgomery, who was vulnerable to complications during 
childbirth on account of her short stature and diabetes. She was not offered a reason-
able alternative to vaginal delivery in the form of elective caesarean section. Mrs 
Montgomery experienced severe problems during her labour, and her child was 
afflicted with cerebral palsy [38 at 6–22]. The Supreme Court upheld the negligence 
claim over non-disclosure of material risks and elective caesarean section not being 
offered an alternative.
The judgment includes three core elements relevant for professionals. First, the 
‘materiality’ of a risk depends on whether ‘a reasonable person in the patient’s posi-
tion’ would be likely to find the risk significant, or if the doctor is (or reasonably 
should be) aware that a particular patient is likely to find it significant [38 at 87]. 
Second, the doctor must explain those material risks to the patient in a ‘comprehen-
sible’ [38 at 90] manner in the course of a dialogue [38 at 88] while taking ‘reason-
able care to ensure’4 that the patient is aware of the material risks and reasonable 
alternatives to proposed intervention [38 at 87]. Third, the therapeutic exception 
(when the professional withholds information after concluding that disclosing a par-
ticular risk would be seriously detrimental to the patient’s health) is permitted. but it 
is a limited exception and must not be abused [38 at 90–91].
Montgomery refers to persons of ‘sound mind’ who have the right to know about 
material risks [38 at 87]. It is not clear what ‘sound mind’ denotes in contemporary 
law and how persons perceived to lack this attribute should be treated in relation to 
disclosures about risks. One view is that Montgomery is applicable to psychiatry 
patients who possess capacity [27, p98]. But an evolving body of case law suggests 
that loss of capacity may result from causes other than mental health issues. Munby 
J observed in SA that a person may be ‘incapacitated from making the relevant deci-
sion by reason of such things as constraint, coercion, undue influence or other vitiat-
ing factors’ [47 at 79]. More recently, the BF case re-emphasises that vulnerability 
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capacity is satisfied [1].5 The case concerned a blind and infirm 97-year-old gentle-
man who was living in squalor under undue influence of his son. The judge ruled 
that his vulnerability necessitated the use of Court’s power of inherent jurisdiction, 
in spite of the gentleman making a capacitous statement of wanting to return home 
from his care placement [1 at 31–34]. The judgment highlights how vulnerability 
may induce choices that are detrimental for the individual, and demonstrates the 
lacuna in law that is being plugged through inherent jurisdiction powers of the court. 
Interpretation of vulnerability and the perceived need to protect a vulnerable indi-
vidual are among the key drivers to this situation.
Discussion into whether ‘sound mind’ equates to absence of vulnerability is 
beyond the scope of this paper. The pertinent issue is that a patient needs to choose 
between options after being aware about risks and benefits associated with proposed 
and alternative options of treatment, and vulnerability may influence this process. If 
a patient is unable to demonstrate this awareness or make an informed decision in 
spite of practicable help, then questions about her decision-making capacity could 
arise. The MCA would need to be considered when there is suggestion or evidence 
of an underlying mental health issue [35, s2–3].
In contrast with Montgomery, the MCA provides a legal framework for others to 
make decisions on behalf of persons who lack decision-making capacity owing to an 
impairment or disturbance in functioning of the mind or brain [35, s3]. The MCA 
describes a ‘functional test’ of capacity encompassing abilities to understand and 
retain relevant information, use or weigh such information as part of the decision-
making process, and communicate the decision by any means [35, s3(1)]. Lack of 
capacity to decide on a specific issue at a particular time must be caused by the 
said impairment/disturbance of the mind or brain. Establishing this ‘clear causative 
nexus’ is essential for judging a person to lack capacity [42 at 52].
The above elements of capacity are equally applicable to deciding about medi-
cal treatment. However, ‘use of information’ is a broad term and would include 
instances where a patient might consider and discard a piece of information without 
appreciating its importance and relevance. This may occur for a variety of reasons 
including her pre-existing values, beliefs, or undue influence of others. The case Re 
T was an example of the latter, where a critically ill woman refused a blood transfu-
sion, with her decision seemingly being influenced by her mother [48]. The Court of 
Appeal observed that such circumstances need examination of the ‘scope and basis’ 
of the decision [48 at 33]. Such examination would involve exploring the patient’s 
thinking process, her reasoning ability and underlying beliefs about her life, family 
and society among others.
Doubts over a patient’s processing of information and applying it to herself could 
precipitate an in-depth assessment of her capacity. This issue will be discussed later, 
but at this point it is helpful to review the first three principles of the MCA, which 
mention
5 The MCA test of capacity will be described later in this section.
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1. A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks 
capacity [35, s1(2)]
2. A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable 
steps to help him to do so have been taken without success [35, s1(3)]
3. A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he 
makes an unwise decision [35, s1(4)].
The fourth and fifth principles refer to persons whose lack of capacity is estab-
lished, and are not relevant for this discussion.
The Code of Practice to the MCA states that capacity may be assessed when there 
is ‘doubt’ about the person’s decision-making abilities as a result of her behaviour, 
circumstances, someone else voicing a concern about her capacity, or when she 
has already been shown to lack capacity to decide on another issue [13, para 4.35]. 
Routine assessment of a person’s understanding and interpretation of information 
in absence of obvious doubt may therefore appear problematic, and requires further 
elaboration.
It is suggested that the presumption of capacity needs to sit alongside the need 
to ensure awareness of risks and alternative options of interventions. But awareness 
cannot occur in absence of understanding. ‘Understanding’ is one of the elements 
underpinning the definition of capacity by the MCA and is an innate ability of the 
patient. Montgomery, on the other hand, refers to the need to ensure awareness, 
which is a responsibility for the healthcare professional [38 at 82 and 87]. But ensur-
ing awareness without errors requires estimation into what the patient may actually 
have understood, and it is important that it should be devoid of errors. Such estima-
tion would indicate her ability at understanding, since the latter is the first of the 
abilities required for capacitous decision-making. It is therefore difficult to avoid 
conflation between an ability of the patient, and the result of her exercising the said 
ability during instillation of awareness into risks of treatment.
A narrow interpretation of the first principle would additionally contribute to this 
presumed conflict. It is fair and logical that when a person needs to make a decision 
on the basis of newly acquired information, she should be able to do so after correct 
understanding and reasoning that would enable her to apply the information to her 
own context. If the clinician identifies distinct difficulties with her comprehension or 
appreciation, then additional measures to aid decision-making would be necessary 
congruent with the second principle. An estimation of the amount of ‘practicable 
steps’ to help her make the decision would also be necessary.6 In other words, the 
clinician would need to confirm that the patient has understood and interpreted the 
information to her individual situation in accordance with her values.
The second principle is of limited utility when clinicians are restricted from con-
firming the above points. The language of the second principle indicates the Act’s 
acknowledgement that there are persons who need additional help and support in 
making their decisions, and which is vital for patients experiencing vulnerability on 
6 Examples would include providing the information in writing or securing the services of an interpreter, 
depending on the specific identified needs of the patient.
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one or more fronts. Identifying this population would be difficult when there is a bar 
on exploring how patients may utilise information, and such proscription should be 
viewed as a systemic contributor to patient vulnerability.
There is no existing suggestion that the first three principles of MCA are hierar-
chical, or the first principle must be accorded greater importance than the second 
and the third.7
It is actually the second principle that may have greater relevance for persons 
who have problems with appreciating information, or making a decision congru-
ent with their values. A constricted interpretation of the first principle would entail 
the professional assuming that the patient has the abilities to understand, retain, and 
weigh information, and which must be respected at the onset. Such presumptions 
may lead to the patient’s misperceptions, misinterpretations or uncertainties remain-
ing obscure,8 or result in the patient accepting risks of magnitude that she might not 
have appreciated.
In contrast with manifest vulnerabilities such as speech or communication prob-
lems, it is the ‘unseen’ inherent and situational vulnerabilities that might evade 
attention in absence of efforts to ensure the patient has acquired accurate awareness 
of risk-related information. This is not to suggest that the second principle be used 
as a conduit to guarantee the making of ‘good’ decisions that are desirable for doc-
tors. Instead, it highlights the significance of this principle in facilitating choices 
based on correct interpretation of information in the light of values and circum-
stances of individual patients.
Post‑Montgomery: Recent Vulnerabilities
Situational vulnerability of patients may be perpetuated in healthcare settings by 
multiple factors. Examples include time constraints, complexities of relevant infor-
mation and difficulties with comprehension. Interpreting statistical uncertainties 
may be a challenge for many [28, p802]. Other inherent vulnerabilities such as dys-
lexia, disorders of attention, or cognitive impairments may hinder a patient’s appli-
cation of provided information to her circumstances. Miola and Heywood have 
pointed out that apart from Montgomery’s stipulating that patients should not be 
bombarded with technical information and the information should be ‘comprehen-
sible’ [38 at 90], the judgment provides little guidance about how complex informa-
tion about treatment and risks should be shared [37].
The importance of correct appreciation of risks cannot be overstated, particularly 
for patients with ‘unseen’ vulnerabilities. A printed medication information sheet 
is of little or no utility for a person with dyslexia or someone with limited English 
language skills. Montgomery states that ‘the doctor’s duty of care takes its precise 
content from the needs, concerns, and circumstances of the individual patient, to 
the extent they are or ought to be known to the doctor’ [38 at 73]. Failure to identify 
7 The first three principles must be followed ahead of the principles 4 and 5, which deal with decision-
making by others in P’s best interests.
8 As was seen in Al-Hamwi, discussed later in this paper.
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such needs, concerns, and values may result in doctors adopting defensive measures 
that may introduce additional vulnerabilities for the patient.
Doctors have expressed concern about how adhering to Montgomery may affect 
their practice [24, 39, 46, 56]. John Reynard provides the example of a rare but pro-
found outcome of a common surgical procedure (Fournier’s gangrene occurring 
after elective circumcision, with an estimated risk of 1 in 50,000) and his practice 
in providing a 100-word description about this risk to every patient scheduled for 
circumcision, specifically mentioning the 30% chance of death if it does materialise 
[50]. This is a misinterpretation of Montgomery since only the ‘material risks’ need 
to be divulged as opposed to every possible risk. It would appear that doctors may 
mistakenly equate ‘material risks’ with the possibility of ‘any rare risk materialis-
ing’, and which would have the added effect of bombarding the patient with infor-
mation that can prove confusing or challenging.9
Academicians have opined that doctors’ concerns over the Montgomery stipula-
tions are ‘overblown’ [16, p124] and good medical practice already requires adop-
tion of the model laid down by the judgment [16, p125]. Such perspectives need to 
be viewed with the requirement for professionals to designate risks as ‘material’ or 
‘not material’, with professional skill and opinion being relevant to the designation 
[38 at 83]. Doctors may argue that any rare risk with profound consequence such 
as death needs to be held as ‘material’. This perspective ignores the values of the 
individual patient from risk categorisation. Whether the patient should be informed 
about a particular material risk is unrelated to medical knowledge and expertise, and 
is an issue for the courts according to Montgomery [38 at 83]. A particular patient 
may also contribute to the categorisation of a risk as ‘material’ or ‘not material’, and 
for this to occur the doctor needs to be aware about her values and preferences10: 
an individual patient may refuse to accept a risk that most patients may not view as 
problematic, and another patient may willingly accept a risk that others might view 
as inordinate.
It has been mentioned earlier that Montgomery describes two contributors to 
materiality of risks: whether a ‘reasonable person in the patient’s position’ would 
find it significant, or whether the doctor is, or reasonably should be aware, that the 
particular patient would find it significant [38 at 87]. It is not clear as to why a refer-
ence to a hypothetical reasonable person is necessary. The judgment in its entirety is 
centred on the interaction between an individual patient and the doctor, along with 
stipulations of the latter’s responsibilities. This is one point in the judgment where 
an external standard is introduced.
‘Reasonable person’ is a legal construct who does not exist in reality [25 at 1–5], 
and whose knowledge, qualifications, and personal traits are difficult to compare 
with that of the average citizen [34, p54]. Furthermore, ‘reasonable person’ is not 
a unitary concept [25]. A disproportionate attention to this legal construct risks 
10 These elements should come to light during the dialogue between the patient and the doctor.
9 An anxious patient may lay greater stress on the ‘30% chance of death’ on materialisation of Fourni-
er’s gangrene in the example provided by Reynard; notwithstanding the fact that the actual risk of death 
would be 30% of 1 in 50,000, which equates to 0.0006%.
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shifting attention away from aspects and requisites of the individual patient. The 
needs of a vulnerable patient are different from that of the hypothetical reasonable 
person (who may have no particular needs at all). The introduction of the ‘reasona-
ble person’ in the framework thus obfuscates the individual patient-centred approach 
and can be interpreted as a new vulnerability.
A patient’s comprehension can be influenced by concomitant stress, coping skills, 
intelligence, and available support systems. She may be overwhelmed by the unex-
pected responsibility that she is suddenly asked to assume, all squeezed within the 
limited consultation time. Vulnerability in itself may influence the amount of risk 
that a patient might find acceptable [40, p2]. A preference for a riskier option, or 
refusal of an essential intervention may point towards an underlying vulnerability, 
or if the patient has not acquired sufficient awareness about a particular risk to her 
situation. A restricted deference to the first principle of MCA would impede doctor’s 
testing of the patient’s awareness.
It may be said that at its core, Montgomery needs an informed patient; who is 
viewed as an independent and autonomous consumer. But adopting the framework 
across medical settings ignores the human vulnerabilities associated with ill-health 
and suffering. Treating vulnerable patients as autonomous consumers risks doctors 
overlooking, exacerbating or creating new vulnerabilities.11 Avoidance of additional 
harm is among the basic principles of medicine, and ethical practice would necessi-
tate ensuring the patient has acquired adequate awareness about material risks. This 
is discussed further in the next section.
Ensuring Awareness
It will be argued in this section that in order to ensure ‘awareness’, confirmation 
of simple or basic ‘understanding’ is inadequate, and requires evaluation of the 
patient’s actual appreciation of risks.
Montgomery does not elaborate on how doctors should ‘ensure’ that the patient 
has acquired awareness of risk-related information, but some form of confirmation 
would appear a logical necessity. Requesting the patient to provide a gist or sum-
mary of the information back to the doctor would count as one option. If there is any 
error on the patient’s part, then further reiteration of the information may be neces-
sary, and additional comprehension aids may require consideration. It was noted in 
Chatterton v Gerson [10] that a patient needs to be ‘informed in broad terms of the 
nature of the procedure’ for her to provide legally valid consent to treatment, [10 at 
433], which is the distinction between trespass or battery and negligence in English 
medical law. Given its relevance to consent, his should be the minimum base stand-
ard for information about material risks as well.
There is scope for debate as to whether probing the patient’s understanding and 
attempts at reinforcement of information are paternalistic, particularly if the patient’s 
11 I am thankful to one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this point.
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response subsequently leads to formal examination of her decision-making capacity. 
The crux of the issue lies in the interpretation of ‘awareness’.
It is difficult to come across a legal definition of ‘awareness’ in English health-
care law. General interpretation of being ‘aware’ conveys being informed, cognisant, 
conscious, and sensible [41], though questions remain over the origin of the concept 
and how it may be measured [11]. There is agreement that ‘awareness’ in situations 
that involve decision-making calls for a level of exertion of cognitive faculty that is 
over and above what guides mundane behaviour [30, p425].
Quoting multiple authors, Margaret Yaruke identifies three levels of awareness, 
where the basic level involves ‘mere apprehension of an object without active atten-
tion’ [60, p260], and where the subject (patient) notices the object but is not obliged 
to change [60, p266]. The next level of awareness involves development of knowl-
edge based on the acquired senses or evidence that go beyond minimal registration, 
when the subject is able to interpret a relationship with the object. Yaruke identifies 
a third level of awareness where the subject develops intellectual recognition of the 
action necessary on her part, with assumption of responsibility [60, p267]. Similar 
hierarchical levels of awareness for other complex cognitive functions such as sec-
ond language learning have been identified by other authors [3, 52 p131–133].
It is suggested that the third level of awareness (as described by Yaruke) is nec-
essary for healthcare-related decision-making, this is because a competent patient 
needs to be aware of what she might be agreeing to, and the implications it would 
have for her. Both of these denote an assumption of responsibility attuned to this 
level of awareness. Coggon and Miola have observed that ‘being informed’ goes 
beyond simple exposure to information, and requires the patient to ‘comprehend and 
compute’ the provided information [12, p546]. The doctor’s responsibility for ensur-
ing awareness of material risks therefore extends to scrutiny of the extent to which 
the patient may have appreciated the information and applied it to her situation. This 
would be a confirmation of the ‘comprehension and computation of information’ as 
mentioned by Coggon and Miola.
But there may be instances where this approach extends to exploration of the 
patient’s reasoning at a level that questions her abilities as an autonomous individual 
who is capable of rational decision-making. There is thus a fine line between ‘weak 
paternalism’ in order to promote awareness as a pathway to authentic decision-mak-
ing, and a ‘harder’ paternalism of probing into capacity at length.
Weak Paternalism
Beauchamp defines ‘paternalism’ as ‘intentional overriding of one person’s autono-
mous choices or actions by another person, where the person who overrides justifies 
the action by appeal to the goal of benefitting, or of preventing or mitigating harm 
to the person whose choices or desires are overridden’ [5, p81]. Feinberg describes 
weak paternalism as permissible limitation of autonomy when the paternalistic actor 
rightfully acts to ‘prevent self-regarding conduct only when it is substantially non-
voluntary or when temporary intervention is necessary to establish when it is vol-
untary or not’ [17, p113]. Sjostrand and others argue that interventions to ensure a 
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patient’s choice to be based on correct appreciation of information are justified and 
would count as weak paternalism [55], and these may be termed ‘paternalism for the 
sake of authenticity’ [55, p715–716].
It is possible for a decision to be voluntary without being authentic, as may occur 
when a patient decides in favour or against a suggested procedure without correct 
interpretation of provided information. Al-Hamwi [2] is a vivid example in this 
regard and reinforces the observation made by Sjostrand et al. [55]. Mrs Al-Hamwi, 
whose first language was not English, was told about the risks of amniocentesis dur-
ing her pregnancy. She misinterpreted the information and believed that the risk of 
miscarriage with amniocentesis was 75%, whereas it was only 1% in reality. She 
declined the procedure, and her son was later born with disabilities that amniocente-
sis would have detected. The judgment observed that clinicians have a responsibility 
to take ‘reasonable and appropriate steps to satisfy themselves that the patient has 
understood the information which has been provided; but the obligation does not 
extend to ensuring that the patient has understood’ it [2 at 69].
The observation in Al-Hamwi appears to suggest that misunderstandings and mis-
communications are unavoidable in doctor-patient interactions [36, p111]. Assump-
tion that the patient possesses the ability to understand does not mean the patient 
has indeed understood the provided information [12, p541].12 Alisdair Maclean sug-
gests that unquestioned assumptions and ‘non-directive counselling’ imposes ‘the 
libertarian ideology of mandatory self-determination’ on the patient.[33, p336]. This 
shortcoming has been addressed through Montgomery’s implicit overruling of Al-
Hamwi,13 but the latter case highlights how vulnerability may be induced through 
assumptions on the part of the professional, and whose likelihood may be increased 
when the patient makes a choice that is ‘unremarkable’ [12, p545], or does not 
markedly stand out as unusual.
If anything, it is such ‘unremarkable’ choices (as opposed to seemingly irrational 
or bizarre choices) that might eclipse underlying vulnerability in absence of efforts 
on the professional’s part. Weak paternalistic measures would address such predica-
ment and ensure the patient’s decision is based on correct comprehension, which is 
precisely the recommendation in Montgomery [38 at 82] As Coggon and Miola have 
pointed out, Mrs Al-Hamwi had ‘lost, or never realised, her autonomy’ [12, p539] 
which would not have been the case if her particular needs had been recognised and 
addressed. Ensuring accurate awareness of risks can therefore be viewed as auton-
omy-promoting for patients who are vulnerable for one or more reason. Although 
the process may necessitate measures in the realm of weak paternalism, it is impor-
tant that weak paternalism should not be used to guide patients towards ‘good’ or 
‘desirable’ decisions; such action would fall in the domain of hard paternalism.
It may be questioned as to what conduct or expectation on part of the patient is 
being prevented by active efforts at ensuring awareness for it to be viewed as pater-
nalistic. A hypothetical examination of an alternative of Al-Hamwi is helpful in 
12 Coggon and Miola highlighted this issue in 2011, 4 years before Montgomery laid down the stipula-
tion for doctors to ensure awareness about risks.
13 As pointed out by Miola and Heywood [37].
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answering this question. Had Mrs Al-Hamwi’s comprehension been put to examina-
tion, it would have involved challenging her comprehension of the risk of amniocen-
tesis. She had already decided, on the basis of reasoning (but based upon mispercep-
tion), that it was not a risk worth accepting. Questioning her comprehension would 
have thwarted her desire to leave the matter at that point with no further considera-
tion of the procedure. This would be paternalistic since it would intervene with what 
she had decided after logical reasoning, albeit on the basis of erroneous comprehen-
sion. In situations as these, explanation of the purpose of further questioning may 
lead to reengagement of the patient, and the intervention would cease to be paternal-
istic at that point. But while she lacks the knowledge into why she must revisit the 
issue, the intervention would retain paternalistic credentials.
Jason Hanna has observed that there is a misconception that weak paternal-
ism permits only temporary interventions to improve awareness [23, p423]. Fein-
berg believed that if a wrong impression is held over a long time, then sustained 
intervention is permissible until the person becomes acquainted with the truth [18, 
p127–128 and 130–131]. It is difficult to assert that such drawn-out interventions 
over unspecified duration do not violate autonomy, particularly when the rationality 
of the patient’s choice is put to test. But this might be unavoidable in some situations 
involving vulnerable patients.
There is thus a risk of overlap between active measures to aid awareness, and 
assessment into whether the patient’s decision is indeed based on comprehension 
and retention of information with subsequent ‘weighing or balancing’, since both 
involve similar cognitive domains. It may also be argued that assessment of the 
patient’s comprehension and reasoning as a prelude to treatment would be the begin-
ning of a slippery slope leading to further questions over decision-making with an 
option of recourse to the therapeutic exception [8, p140]. Another pertinent ques-
tion is whether it is possible to demarcate between purported ‘weak’ paternalism 
and ‘hard’ alternatives. Telling a patient who prefers not to know about risks that 
it is an unacceptable way to decide about treatment would be a ‘hard’ approach, 
coupled with increased influencing of patient choice from ‘persuasion’ to ‘coercion’ 
[57, p118–119].
A conflict with the ruling in Wandsworth [31] may arise if patients are unaware of 
the purpose of explanation and questioning into their awareness of the risks. Hayden 
J observed in Wandsworth that explanation of the ‘purpose and extent’ of assess-
ment is a mandatory prerequisite to any assessment of decision-making capacity [31 
at 49]. Exploration into the patient’s awareness of material risks without explanation 
of the underlying reason may breach this case law, since both circumstances involve 
probing similar attributes. But from an ethical perspective, active confirmation of a 
patient’s awareness with the aim of preventing harm would remain within the spec-
trum of paternalistic intervention.
The above needs to be viewed with findings that multiple instances of weak 
paternalism are prevalent in healthcare [9, 29, 51]. Montgomery stresses the 
necessity for clinicians to respect the patient’s ‘entitlement to decide on the 
risks to her health that she is willing to ‘run’ [38 at 83], which is respectful of 
autonomy. But the stipulation that professionals should make reasonable efforts 
to ensure the patient is ‘aware’ about material risks [38 at 87] can be interpreted 
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as a protection for vulnerable individuals against exposing themselves to unap-
preciated levels of risk. Weak paternalism is thus integral to Montgomery, with 
its implicit recognition of the necessity for correct awareness about material risks 
that may prove to be the difference between an uneventful cure and an unfortu-
nate outcome.
Conclusion
This paper has looked into the interaction of patient vulnerability with decision-
making in the context of medical treatment. It has been highlighted how vulner-
able patients might be at distinct risk when there is inadequate exploration into 
their awareness of risks, and the safeguard that Montgomery provides in this 
regard. Development of such awareness demands a high level of engagement with 
the information and cognitive processing, which may be influenced by inherent 
and situational vulnerabilities. It is suggested that healthcare professionals have a 
duty to identify vulnerabilities of patients, which includes assessing the patient’s 
awareness and appreciation of information. The approach is congruent with 
Montgomery and recommendations by the General Medical Council to doctors 
[21, paras 13–15]; and requires focus on the ‘particular’ vulnerable patient rather 
than the ‘reasonable person in the patient’s position’.
Compliance with the stipulation laid down by Montgomery to ensure the 
patient is aware of the material risks of treatment can be seen to involve weak 
paternalism, while being supportive of vulnerable patients in making authentic 
choices about their treatment. Not questioning or confirming a patient’s decision 
on the ground that it would be an assault on her autonomy could subsequently 
expose her to greater harm for which the doctor would bear moral responsibility. 
However, there is a clear need for professionals to tread carefully between weak 
and hard paternalism. It is also a legal necessity to keep patients informed about 
measures to help optimise her awareness about risks and benefits of treatment.
Herring and Wall have warned that having ‘others harm you and to be told no 
protection is offered because you have chosen this harm, even though it is against 
your deepest values, is horrific’ [26, p713]. This is pertinent for patients who 
accept interventions without full appreciation of associated risks, and when such 
choices are interpreted by others as voluntary decisions without recognition of 
various vulnerabilities that patients might be subject to. Active efforts at ensuring 
comprehension and appreciation of information therefore needs to be integrated 
as an essential aspect of professional practice in healthcare.
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